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Abstract8
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e.,9
scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of10
the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed11
only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of12
hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges13
are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there14
are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers.15
We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance16
than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful17
mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar18
graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of19
minimizing or maximizing the Lp-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan20
minimization that corresponds to p = ∞, and extend the results to any p > 0.21
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1 Introduction29
This work belongs to the area of mechanism design, one of the most researched branches30
of Game Theory and Microeconomics with numerous applications in environments where a31
protocol of conduct of selfish participants is required. The goal is to design an algorithm,32
called mechanism, which is robust under selfish behavior and that produces a social outcome33
with a certain guaranteed quality. The mechanism solicits the preferences of the participants34
over the outcomes, in forms of bids, and then selects one of the outcomes. The challenge stems35
from the fact that the real preferences of the participants are private, and the participants36
care only about maximizing their private utilities and hence they will lie if a false report37
is profitable. A truthful mechanism provides incentives such that a truthful bid is the best38
action for each participant.39
Despite the importance of the problem the only general positive result for multi-40
dimensional domains is the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [43, 15, 26]41
and its affine extensions, known as affine maximizers.42
In their seminal paper on algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen [39] proposed43
the scheduling problem on unrelated machines as a central problem to understand the44
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algorithmic aspects of mechanism design. The objective is to incentivize n machines to45
execute m tasks, so that the maximum completion time of the machines, i.e. the makespan,46
is minimized. Scheduling, a problem that has been extensively studied from the classical47
algorithmic perspective, proved to be the perfect ground to study the limitations that48
truthfulness imposes on algorithm design.49
Nisan and Ronen applied the VCG mechanism, the most successful generic machinery50
in mechanism design, which truthfully implements the outcome that maximizes the social51
welfare. In the case of scheduling, the allocation of the VCG is the greedy allocation in52
which each task is assigned to the machine with minimum processing time. This mechanism53
is truthful, but has a poor approximation ratio of n for the makespan. They conjectured54
that this is the best guarantee that can be achieved by any deterministic (polynomial-time55
or not) truthful mechanism and this conjecture, known as the Nisan-Ronen conjecture, is56
widely perceived as the holy grail in algorithmic mechanism design.57
An interesting special case of the scheduling problem, which is well-understood, is the58
single-dimensional mechanism design in which the values of each player are linear expressions59
of a single parameter. The principal representative is the problem of scheduling related60
machines, where the cost of each machine can be expressed via a single parameter, its61
speed. This was first studied by Archer and Tardos [1], who showed that in contrast to the62
unrelated machines version, an algorithm that minimizes the makespan can be truthfully63
implemented — albeit in exponential time. It was subsequently shown that truthfulness64
has essentially no impact on the computational complexity of the problem. Specifically, a65
randomized truthful-in-expectation1 PTAS was given in [18] and a deterministic PTAS was66
given in [14]; a PTAS is the best possible algorithm even for the pure algorithmic problem67
(unless P = NP ).68
1.1 Summary of Results69
In this work, we show how to combine these two main positive results of VCG and single-70
dimensional mechanisms into a single mechanism, which we call the Hybrid Mechanism. This71
new mechanism applies to domains in which some players are multidimensional and some72
players are single-dimensional. A typical example is to schedule m tasks, such that task i73
can only be executed by player 0 and player i. In this case, player 0 is multidimensional and74
the other m players are single-dimensional. We call this the star balancing problem. This is75
a multidimensional mechanism design problem for which the VCG mechanism, as well as76
every other known mechanism, performs very poorly. However, as we show in Section 3.1,77
the Hybrid Mechanism has approximation ratio 2, optimal among all truthful mechanisms.78
We generalize the star balancing problem in three directions: graphs/multigraphs, hyperstars79
and also to objectives other than makespan minimization. Due to space limitations, omitted80
proofs are presented in the full version.81
(Multi)Graphs. A generalization of the star balancing problem to graphs and multigraphs82
is the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem (Section 3). This is a special case of unrelated83
machines scheduling in which there is a (multi)graph whose nodes represent the machines84
and whose edges represent tasks that can be executed only by the incident nodes. For general85
graphs, all machines are multiparameter, but we can still apply the Hybrid Mechanism, if we86
1 This is one of the two main definitions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, where truth-telling
maximizes the expected utility of each player.
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first decompose the graph into stars and then apply the Hybrid Mechanism to each one of87
them. The combined mechanism, which we call the Star-Cover Mechanism, has surprisingly88
good approximation ratio for certain classes of graphs — ratio 4 for trees, 8 for planar89
graphs, and 2k + 2 for k-degenerate graphs (Corollary 15). These results use as ingredient90
the analysis of star graphs, in which the Hybrid Mechanism has approximation ratio 2.91
Hyperstars. In the hyperstar version, there are k multidimensional players/machines and92
every task can be executed by any one of these k players or by a task-specific single-dimensional93
player. Specifically, there are k different root players (players 1, 2, . . . , k with bids (rij)k×m)94
and each of them are allowed to process all tasks. In addition, for each task there is one95
leaf player, which can process only this single task (players k + 1, k + 2, . . . , k + m with96
bids (ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . ℓm)). Note that the root players without the leaves form a classic input for97
unrelated scheduling mechanisms with k players and m-tasks. We can now state the Hybrid98
Mechanism for this case.99













where the λi can be arbitrary non-negative real numbers and (gT )T ⊆M can be any functions100
that guarantee that the leaf players are truthful. The output of the mechanism is the subset of101
tasks T that are allocated to the multidimensional root players together with their allocation102
matrix xT . The remaining tasks, M \ T , are allocated to the leaf players.103
VCG fairs poorly, yielding approximation ratio m in this domain, but the Hybrid104
Mechanism has approximation ratio k + 1, as stated in the next theorem. Due to space105
limitations, we provide details and proofs in the full version of the paper.106
▶ Theorem 2. For the hyperstar scheduling problem, the Hybrid Mechanism with gT (ℓ) =107
maxj /∈T ℓj , and with λi = 1, for every i, is (k + 1)-approximate.108
In Section 4 we provide general definitions as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for109
truthfulness of the Hybrid Mechanism.110
Mechanisms for Lp-norm optimization. In Section 5, we consider the much more general111
objective of minimizing or maximizing the Lp-norm of the values of the players, for p > 0.112
The scheduling problem is the special case of minimizing the L∞-norm. We show that the113
Hybrid Mechanism performs very well for this much more general problem, and in some cases114
it has the optimal approximation ratio among all truthful mechanisms. This illustrates the115
applicability and usefulness of the Hybrid Mechanism in applications with various domains116
and objectives. We emphasize that for all these cases, even for stars, all known mechanisms117
such as the VCG and affine maximizers have very poor performance.118
Relation to the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. Our results on (multi)graphs show that this119
domain may provide an easier way to attack the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. In a recent120
work [12], we showed a Ω(
√
n) lower bound for multistars with edge multiplicity only 2, when121
the root player has submodular or supermodular valuations. In contrast, our results in this122
work show that for additive valuations, the Star-Cover Mechanism has approximation ratio 4123
on the very same multigraphs. However, the Hybrid and the Star-Cover Mechanisms have124
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high approximation for multistars with high edge-multiplicity or for simple clique graphs.125
It is natural to ask whether there are other, better mechanisms for these cases. Recently126
we have proved a Ω(
√
n) lower bound for the former case, which is the first super-constant127
lower bound for the Nisan-Ronen problem [11], and we conjecture that the latter case admits128
similarly a high, perhaps even linear, lower bound.129
We remark that all previous lower bound proofs use inherently either (multi)graphs130
[13, 29, 11] or, recently, hypergraphs with hyperedges of small size [24, 20]. Our work131
provides new methodological tools to study these objects, that can help to identify certain132
(hyper)graph structures as good candidates for high lower bounds and to avoid those where133
low upper bounds exist. For example, the 2.755 lower bound construction of [24] uses a134
hyperstar with k = 2, for which the Hybrid Mechanism achieves an upper bound of 3 (Thm 2).135
All our lower bounds are information theoretic and hold independently of the computa-136
tional time of the mechanisms. Conversely, all upper bounds are polynomial time algorithms137
when the star decomposition is given. We leave it open whether computing an optimal138
star decomposition of a graph is in P , although it follows from our results that it can be139
approximated with an additive term of 1 in polynomial time (actually in linear time).140
1.2 Related Work141
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture [39] has become one of the central problems in Algorithmic142
Game Theory, and despite intensive efforts it remains open. The original paper showed that143
no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 for144
two machines, which was later improved to 2.41 [13] for three machines, and finally to 2.618145
[29] which was the best known bound for over a decade. Recent progress improved this bound146
to 2.755 [24], to 3 [20] and finally to the first non-constant lower bound of 1 +
√
n− 1 [11].147
The best known upper bound is n [39].148
The purely algorithmic problem of makespan minimization on unrelated machines is149
one of the most important scheduling problems. The seminal paper of Lenstra, Shmoys150
and Tardos [32], gave a 2-approximation algorithm, and also showed that it is NP-hard to151
approximate within a factor of 3/2. Closing this gap has remained open for 30 years, and is152
considered one of the most important open questions in scheduling.153
In this work we consider the design of truthful mechanisms for the Unrelated Graph154
Balancing problem, a special but quite rich case of the unrelated machines problem, which155
was previously studied by Verschae and Wiese [42], for which each task can only be assigned156
to two machines. This can be formulated as a graph problem, where given an undirected157
(multi)-graph G = (V,E), each vertex corresponds to a machine, and each edge corresponds158
to a task. The goal is to allocate each edge to one of its nodes, in a way that minimizes the159
maximum (weighted) in-degree.160
The special case of this problem where each direction of an edge corresponds to the161
same processing time t(e) is known as Graph Balancing, and was introduced by Ebenlendr,162
Krcál, and Sgall [21] who showed an 1.75-approximate algorithm and also demonstrated that163
the problem retains the hardness of the unrelated machines problem, by showing that it is164
NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than 3/2.165
Graph Balancing. As was already mentioned, for the pure graph balancing problem, the166
best approximation ratio for classical polynomial time algorithms is 1.75 by [21]. Wang and167
Sitters [44] showed a different LP-based algorithm with a higher ratio of 11/6 ≈ 1.83, while168
Huang and Ott [27] designed a purely combinatorial approximation algorithm but with also169
a higher guarantee of 1.857.170
Jansen and Rohwedder [28] studied the so-called configuration LP which was introduced171
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by Bansal and Sviridenko [6]. They showed that it has an integrality gap of at most 1.749172
breaking the 1.75 barrier of the integrality gaps of the previous LP formulations. This leaves173
open the possibility of using this LP to produce an approximation algorithm with a ratio174
better than 1.75.175
Verschae and Wiese [42] studied the unrelated version of graph balancing (whose strategic176
variant we consider in this paper) and showed that the integrality gap of the configuration177
LP is equal to 2, which is much higher comparing to graph balancing. They also showed a178
2-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the minimum load, which is the179
best possible unless P=NP.180
The problem has been studied for various special graph classes. For the case of simple181
graphs (also known as Graph Orientation), Asahiro et al [2] showed that the problem is in P182
for the case of trees, while Asahiro, Miyano and Ono [3] showed that it becomes strongly183
NP-hard for planar and bipartite graphs. Finally, Lee, Leung and Pinedo [31] concluded the184
case of trees in the case of multiple edges, showing an FPTAS which is the best possible,185
given that the problem in multi-graphs is immediately NP-hard even for the simple case of186
two vertices (due to reduction from Subset Sum).187
Truthful Scheduling. The lack of progress in the original unrelated machine problem188
led to the study of special cases where progress has been made. Ashlagi et al.[4], resolved189
a restricted version of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture, for the special but natural class of190
anonymous mechanisms. Lavi and Swamy [30] studied a restricted input domain which191
however retains the multi-dimensional flavour of the setting. They considered inputs with192
only two possible values “low” and “high”, that are publicly known to the designer. For this193
case they showed an elegant deterministic mechanism with an approximation factor of 2.194
They also showed that even for this setting achieving the optimal makespan is not possible195
under truthfulness, and provided a lower bound of 11/10. Yu [45] extended the results for a196
range of values, and Auletta et al. [5] studied multi-dimensional domains where the private197
information of the machines is a single bit.198
Randomization has led to mildly improved guarantees. There are two extensions of199
truthfulness for randomized mechanisms; universal truthfulness if the mechanism is described200
as a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, and truthfulness-in-201
expectation, if in expectation no player can benefit by lying. The former notion was first202
considered in [39] for two machines, it was later extended to n machines by Mu’alem and203
Schapira [38] and finally Lu and Yu [35] showed a 0.837n-approximate mechanism, which is204
currently the best known. Lu and Yu [36] showed a truthful-in-expectation mechanism with205
an approximation guarantee of (m+ 5)/2. Mu’alem and Schapira [38], showed a lower bound206
of 2 − 1/m, for both notions of randomization. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács [10]207
extended this lower bound for fractional mechanisms, where each task can be split to multiple208
machines, and they also showed a fractional mechanism with a guarantee of (m+ 1)/2. The209
special case of two machines [34, 36] is still unresolved; currently, the best upper bound is210
1.587 due to Chen, Du, and Zuluaga [9].211
The case of related machines is well understood. It falls into the so-called single-212
dimensional mechanism design in which the valuations of a player are linear expressions of a213
single parameter. In this case, the cost of each machine is expressed via a single parameter, its214
(inverse) speed multiplied by the workload allocated to the machine, instead of an m-valued215
vector, as it is the case for the unrelated machines and the Graph Balancing setting. Archer216
and Tardos [1] showed that, in contrast to the unrelated machines version, the optimal217
makespan can be achieved by an (exponential-time) truthful algorithm, while [14] gave a218
deterministic truthful PTAS which is the best possible even for the pure algorithmic problem219
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(unless P=NP).220
Truthful implementation of other objectives was considered by Mu’alem and Schapira [38]221
for multi-dimensional problems and by Epstein, Levin and van Stee [22] for single-dimensional222
ones. Leucci, Mamageishvili and Penna [33] demonstrated high lower bounds for other min-223
max objectives on some combinatorial optimization problems on graphs, showing essentially224
that VCG is the best mechanism for these problems. Minooei and Swamy [37] considered225
a multi-dimensional vertex cover problem, and approached in by decomposition into single226
parameter problems.227
The Bayesian setting, where the players costs are drawn from a probability distribution228
has also been studied. Daskalakis and Weinberg [17] showed a mechanism that is at229
most a factor of 2 from the optimal truthful mechanism, but not with respect to the230
optimal makespan. Chawla et al. [8] provided bounds of prior-independent mechanisms231
(where the input distribution is unknown to the mechanism), while Giannakopoulos and232
Kyropoulou [25] showed that the VCG mechanism achieves a factor of O(logn/ log logn)233
under some distributional and symmetry assumptions.234
Recently Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Kovács [12] showed a lower bound of
√
n− 1235
for all deterministic truthful mechanisms, when the cost of processing a subset of tasks is236
given by a submodular (or supermodular) set function, instead of an additive function which237
is assumed in the standard scheduling setting.238
2 Preliminaries239
Scheduling. In the classical unrelated machines scheduling there is a set N of n machines240
and a set M of m tasks that need to be scheduled on the machines. The input is given by241
a nonnegative matrix t = (tij)n×m : machine i needs time tij ∈ R≥0 to process task j, and242
her costs are additive, i.e., the processing time for machine i for a set of tasks Xi ⊂ M is243
ti(Xi) :=
∑
j∈Xi tij . The objective is to minimize the makespan (min-max objective). An244
allocation to all machines X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), (which is a partition of M) can also be245
denoted by the characteristic matrix x = (xij) where xij = 1 if j ∈ Xi, and xij = 0 otherwise.246
The current work essentially considers a special case of unrelated scheduling, in which247
every task can be processed by two designated machines. The tasks can thus be modelled by248
the edges of a graph, and the associated problem is also known as Unrelated Graph Balancing.249
More formally, in the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem, there is a given undirected graph250
G = (V,E); the vertices correspond to a set of machines N = V and the edges to a set of251
tasks M = E. For each edge e ∈ E only its two incident vertices can process the job e,252
and they have in general different processing times ti(e), and ti′(e). The goal is to assign253
a direction to each edge e = (i, i′) (allocate the corresponding task) of the graph, to one254
of the incident vertices (machines). The completion time of each vertex i is then the total255
processing time of the jobs Xi assigned to it ti(Xi) =
∑
e∈Xi ti(e). The objective is to find an256
allocation that minimizes the makespan, i.e. the maximum completion time over all vertices.257
Mechanism design setting. We assume that each machine i ∈ N is controlled by a selfish258
agent that is reluctant to process the tasks and the cost function ti is private information259
(also called the type of agent i). A mechanism asks the agents to report (bid) their types ti,260
and based on the collected bids it allocates the jobs, and gives payments to the agents. A261
player may report a false cost function bi ̸= ti, if this serves her interests.262
Formally, a mechanism (X,P ) consists of two parts:263
An allocation algorithm: The allocation algorithm X allocates the tasks to the machines264
depending on the players’ bids b = (b1, . . . , bn). We denote by Xi(b) the subset of tasks265
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assigned to machine i in the bid profile b.266
A payment scheme: The payment scheme P = (P1, . . . , Pn) determines the payments also267
depending on the bid values b. The functions P1, . . . , Pn stand for the payments that the268
mechanism hands to each agent.269
The utility ui of a player i is the payment that she gets minus the actual time that she270
needs to process the set of tasks assigned to her, ui(b) = Pi(b) − ti(Xi(b)). We are interested271
in truthful mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful, if for every player, reporting his true type272
is a dominant strategy. Formally,273
ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(t′i, b−i), ∀i ∈ N, ti, t′i ∈ Rm≥0, b−i ∈ R
(n−1)×m
≥0 ,
where b−i denotes the reported bidvectors of all players disregarding i.274
We are looking for truthful mechanisms with low approximation ratio of the allocation275
algorithm for the makespan irrespective of the running time to compute X and P. In other276
words, our lower bounds are information-theoretic and do not take into account computational277
issues.278
A useful characterization of truthful mechanisms in terms of the following monotonicity279
condition, helps us to get rid of the payments and focus on the properties of the allocation280
algorithm.281
▶ Definition 3 (Weak Monotonicity). An allocation algorithm X is called weakly monotone282
(WMON) if it satisfies the following property: for every two inputs t = (ti, t−i) and t′ =283
(t′i, t−i), the associated allocations X and X ′ satisfy ti(Xi) − ti(X ′i) ≤ t′i(Xi) − t′i(X ′i).284
It is well known that the allocation function of every truthful mechanism is WMON [7],285
and also that this is a sufficient condition for truthfulness in convex domains [41].286
The following lemma was essentially shown in [39] and has been a useful tool to show287
lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for several variants (see for example [13, 38]).288
▶ Lemma 4. Let t be a bid vector, and let S = Xi(t) be the subset assigned to player i by289
a weakly monotone allocation X. For any bid vector t′ = (t′i, t−i) such that only the bid of290
machine i has changed and in such a way that for every task in S it has decreased (i.e.,291
t′ij < tij , j ∈ S) and for every other task it has increased (i.e., t′ij > tij , j ∈ M \ S). Then292
the mechanism does not change the allocation to machine i, i.e., Xi(t′) = Xi(t) = S.293
In general, when the values of a machine change, the allocation of the other machines may294
change, this issue being the pivotal difficulty of truthful unrelated scheduling. Allocation295
algorithms that “promise” not to change the allocation of other machines as long as changing296
(only) ti does not affect the set Xi, are less problematic. These allocation rules are called297
local in [39], where it is shown that local truthful mechanisms cannot have a better than n298
approximation.299
▶ Definition 5 (Local mechanisms). A mechanism is local if for every i ∈ N , for every t−i, and300
ti, t
′
i for which Xi(ti, t−i) = Xi(t′i, t−i) also holds that Xj(ti, t−i) = Xj(t′i, t−i) (∀j ∈ N).301
There are several special classes of mechanisms that satisfy this property, perhaps the302
most prominent one is the class of affine minimizers (see, e.g., [13]).303
3 Graph Balancing304
In this section we focus on the (Unrelated) Graph Balancing problem, which is a special305
case of makespan minimization of scheduling unrelated machines. The Graph Balancing306
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is a multi-parameter mechanism design problem that retains most of the difficulty of the307
Nisan-Ronen conjecture, yet has certain features that make it more amenable.308
One of the difficulties in dealing with truthful mechanisms is that while truthfulness is309
a local property (i.e., independent truthfulness conditions, one per player), the allocation310
algorithm is a global function (that involves all players). Local algorithms attempt to311
reconcile this tension by insisting that the allocation is also “local”, but they take this notion312
too far. The results of this work show that locality in mechanisms is very restrictive in some313
domains, where the Hybrid Mechanism outperforms every local mechanism.314
The Graph Balancing problem is more amenable than the general scheduling problem315
because it exhibits another kind of locality, domain locality: when a machine does not get316
a task, we know which machines gets it. Yet, this locality is not very restrictive and the317
problem retains most of its original difficulty.318
In this section, we take advantage of domain locality to obtain an optimal mechanism319
for stars. It turns out that this mechanism, the Hybrid Mechanism, is a special case of a320
more general mechanism. But since the Hybrid Mechanism does not apply to general graphs,321
we also propose the Star-Cover mechanism for general graphs: decompose the graph into322
stars and apply the Hybrid Mechanism independently to each star. In this way, we obtain a323
4-approximation algorithm for trees and similar positive results for other types of graphs.324
Makespan minimization is the special case, when p = ∞, of minimizing the Lp-norm of325
the values of the players. Other special cases of the Lp-norm optimization is the case p = 1,326
which corresponds to welfare maximization, and the case p = 0, which is related to Nash327
Social Welfare [16]. We deal with this more general problem in another section (Section 5).328
Most of the results and proofs of this section generalize to any p ≥ 1. We provide almost329
all the proofs in this section, because we believe that the Graph Balancing problem is an330
important problem in its own right and because the treatment is simpler and more intuitive,331
and we omit most of the (more general) results of Section 5 that deals with the Lp-norm332
minimization, due to space limitations.333
3.1 Stars and the Hybrid Mechanism334
In this subsection, we focus on star graphs, where there are n = m+ 1 players and m tasks.335
Player 0 is the root of the star, and has processing times given by a vector r = (r1, r2, . . . rm).336
We also refer to this player as the root player or r-player. For given bids r of the root player,337
and task set T ⊆ M we use the short notation r(T ) =
∑
j∈T rj .338
There are also m leaf-players, one for each leaf of the star with processing times ℓ =339
(ℓ1, . . . , ℓm) respectively. Each task j can only be assigned to two players; either to the root,340
with processing time rj , or to the leaf with processing time ℓj .341
As usual, we denote by r−i the vector of bids of the root player except for the bid for342
task i, and similarly ℓ−i denotes the bids of all leaf-players, except for player i. The vector of343
all input bids is given by t = (r, ℓ).344
As we show later in the Lower Bound section (Section 3.3), all previously known mechan-345
isms for the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem, e.g. affine minimizers and task independent346
mechanisms, have approximation ratio at least
√
n− 1 for graphs, even for stars.347
In contrast, we now show that the Hybrid Mechanism has constant approximation ratio348
for stars.349
▶ Definition 6 (Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing). Consider an instance of the Unrelated350









Figure 1 An instance of the Hybrid Mechanism, for the star of m = 2 leaves. It shows the
partition of bid-space of the root player induced by the allocation of the Hybrid Mechanism when
ℓ1 ≥ ℓ2 (left) and when ℓ2 ≥ ℓ1 (right). In the left case, the root gets both tasks in the area near
(0, 0), it gets only task 1 when r1 ≤ ℓ1 − ℓ2 and r2 ≥ ℓ2, and it gets neither task otherwise. Note that,
in contrast to VCG, for every set of fixed values for the leaves, only three allocations are possible.
Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and set of tasks M . Let351
S ∈ arg min
T ⊆M




The mechanism assigns a set of tasks S to the root and the remaining tasks to leaves. Ties354
are broken in a deterministic way (e.g., lexicographically).355
Figure 1 shows the partition of the space of the root player induced by the Hybrid356
Mechanism for a star of two leaves.357
The argmin expression that defines the Hybrid Mechanism and a corresponding expression358
that defines the VCG mechanism are similar: in the definition of VCG, instead of maxi ̸∈T ℓi,359
we have
∑
i ̸∈T ℓi. It is a happy coincidence that replacing the operator sum with max360
preserves the truthfulness of the mechanism, a fact that rarely holds.361
▶ Lemma 7. The Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing on stars is truthful and has362
approximation ratio 2.363
Proof. The root player has no incentive to lie since − maxi ̸∈T ℓi can be interpreted as its364
payments. The reason that leaf players have no incentive to lie comes essentially from the365
fact that the expression in (1) is monotone in ℓi (see Section 4, for a more rigorous and366
extensive treatment of the truthfulness of the general Hybrid Mechanism).367
Let S∗ = arg minT ⊆M max{r(T ), maxi̸∈T ℓi} be the subset assigned to the root in the368
optimal allocation, OPT be the optimal makespan, and ALG be the makespan achieved by369
the Hybrid Mechanism. Then we have370
ALG ≤ min
T ⊆M
{r(T ) + max
i ̸∈T
ℓi} ≤ r(S∗) + max
i ̸∈S∗





3.2 Upper bound for general graphs and multigraphs374
We now turn our attention to positive (upper bound) results for general graphs and multi-375
graphs. We will need a few definitions first.376
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▶ Definition 8 (Star decomposition). A star decomposition of a (multi)graph G(V,E) is377
a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} of its edges into stars (see Figure 2 for an example). Let378
V (Ti) denote the vertex set of the star spanned by Ti. The star contention number of a star379
decomposition is the maximum number of stars that include a node either as a root or as380
a leaf: c(T ) = maxv∈V |{i : v ∈ V (Ti), i = 1, . . . , k}|. The star contention number of a381
(multi)graph is the minimum star contention number among all its star decompositions.382
In an optimal star decomposition of a graph (but not multigraph), we can assume that383
every node is the root of at most one star, otherwise we can merge stars with common root384
without changing the star contention number.385
A related notion to star decomposition that has been studied extensively is the notion of386
edge orientation of a multigraph (or of load balancing when we consider multigraphs).387
▶ Definition 9 (Edge orientation number). Define the orientation number of a given orientation388
of the edges of a multigraph G, as its maximum in-degree. The edge orientation number o(G)389
of a multigraph G is the minimum orientation number among all its possible orientations.390
Indeed the two notions are closely related: every star decomposition corresponds to a391
graph orientation by orienting the edges in all stars from roots to leaves, and vice versa a392
graph orientation gives rise to a star decomposition in which every node with its outgoing393
edges defines a star. Given that in an optimal star decomposition of a graph, each node is394
the root of at most one star, we get that for every graph G:395
o(G) ≤ c(G) ≤ o(G) + 1.396
397
This relation for multigraphs is similar only that in the right hand side we add the maximum398
edge multiplicity w instead of 1, i.e., o(G) ≤ c(G) ≤ o(G) + w.399
The following definition utilizes the Hybrid Mechanism on stars to obtain a general400
mechanism for arbitrary graphs (and multigraphs).401
▶ Definition 10 (Star-Cover Mechanism). Let G = (V,E) be a multigraph and let T =402
{T1, . . . , Tk} be a fixed star decomposition. The Star-Cover mechanism runs the Hybrid403
Mechanism on every star of T independently. That is, if Si,h is the subset of tasks allocated404
to a player i by the Hybrid Mechanism when applied to a star Th, the set of tasks allocated to405
player i is Si = ∪kh=1Si,h.406
We can now state and prove the general positive theorem of this section.407
▶ Theorem 11. The Star-Cover mechanism for a given multigraph G that uses the Hybrid408
Mechanism on every star of a fixed star decomposition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} is truthful and has409
an approximation ratio at most 2c(T ).410
Proof. Fix some player i and let Si,h be the subset of tasks allocated to player i by the411
Star Mechanism when applied to a star Th, h = 1, . . . , k. Truthfulness is an immediate412
consequence of the following two observations. First, since the fixed star decomposition is413
independent of player i’s processing times, player i cannot affect it by lying. Second, Si,h is414
independent of player i’s processing times ti(e) for all edges e ̸∈ Th, therefore player i cannot415
alter the assignment on Th by changing its values outside Th.416
To see the approximation guarantee, let OPT , OPT (Th) be the optimal makespan on G417
and Th respectively, and let ALG and ALG(Th) be the makespan achieved by the Star-Cover418
mechanism on G and Th.419
ALG ≤ max
h=1,...,k
c(T ) ·ALG(Th) ≤ max
h=1,...,k
c(T ) · 2OPT (Th) ≤ 2c(T ) ·OPT.420
421
◀422
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Due to the connection between star decompositions and edge orientations in graphs, we get423
▶ Corollary 12. The approximation ratio for graphs with edge orientation number o(G) is at424
most 2o(G) + 2.425
In the sequel, we consider particular bounds for certain classes of graphs. It is known426
that the edge orientation number of a given graph can be computed in polynomial time [2].427
In fact, by an application of the max-flow-min-cut theorem it can be shown that o(G) ≤ γ iff428
for every subgraph H of G it holds that |E(H)| ≤ γ|V (H)|. Since this equivalent condition2429
holds for planar graphs with γ = 3, we immediately obtain:430
▶ Theorem 13. For every planar graph, there exists a truthful mechanism with approximation431
ratio 8.432
A natural class of graphs fulfilling this property (with γ = k) is k-degenerate graphs. A433
graph G(V,E) is called k-degenerate [23] (or k-inductive) if there is an ordering v1, . . . , vn434
of its nodes such that the number of neighbors of vi in {vi+1, . . . , vn} is at most k. Many435
interesting classes of graphs are k-degenerate for some small k. Besides planar graphs (with436
k = 5), another example is given by k-trees [40]: by definition, a k-tree is a degenerate graph437
with an ordering such that every vi (except for the last k nodes of the ordering) has exactly k438
neighbors in {vi+1, . . . , vn} and these k neighbors form a clique. Since graphs of treewidth k439
are subgraphs of k-trees [40], they are also k-degenerate. In particular, trees are 1-degenerate.440
We give here a direct proof and illustration of a star decomposition for k-degenerate graphs:441
▶ Theorem 14. For every k-degenerate graph, there is a truthful mechanism with approxim-442
ation ratio 2k + 2.443
Proof. Consider a k-degenerate graph G. It suffices to show that it admits a star decompos-444
ition with contention number k + 1. Let v1, . . . , vn be an inductive ordering of the nodes of445
G. We consider the star covering {T2, . . . , Tn} where Ti is the star with root vi and leaves446
all its neighbors in {v1, . . . , vi−1}. Note that stars are created in the opposite direction of447
the inductive order (see Figure 2). This star decomposition has contention number k + 1448
since every node belongs to at most one star as a root and to at most k stars as a leaf. ◀449
▶ Corollary 15. There exist truthful mechanisms with approximation ratio at most 4 for450
trees, and generally of ratio at most 2k + 2 for graphs of treewidth k.451
3.3 Lower Bounds for Graph Balancing452
In this subsection, we show corresponding negative results for the positive results of the453
previous subsection. We first observe that the natural candidate mechanisms for the Graph454
Balancing problem have very poor performance, in stark contrast to the Hybrid Mechanism.455
▶ Theorem 16. All local mechanisms for stars, including VCG, affine minimizers and456





2 This characterization of the orientation number o(G) implies that a truthful mechanism with constant
approximation ratio exists for any minor-closed class of graphs, because for every class of graphs with
forbidden minors, there exists some constant γ that satisfies the property (see Theorems 7.2.3, 7.2.4
and Lemma 12.6.1. in [19]). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Figure 2 The star decomposition used in Theorem 14 of a 2-degenerate graph. The inductive
order is upwards, while the stars are “pointing” downwards.







· · · 1√
m
1 ∞ · · · ∞
∞ 1 · · · ∞
∞ ∞ · · · 1
 .
If, in the allocation of the mechanism, the root player takes all the tasks, then this458
allocation has approximation
√
m, as the optimal allocation is to assign the tasks to the459
leaves with makespan equal to 1. Otherwise, assume that (at least) one of the tasks, is given460
to some other player, say w.l.o.g. task 1 is given to player 1. By a series of applications of461
Lemma 4, and by exploiting the locality of the mechanism, we set the value of the owner of462
task j to 0 for every j ̸= 1.463
In particular, let S be the set of tasks assigned to the root player, and M \S be the tasks464
assigned to their respective leaf-player. Let t1 = (r′, ℓ1, . . . , ℓm), with r′ defined as follows465
for some arbitrarily small ϵ.466
r′j =
{




By applying Lemma 4, the root player receives again the set S, and therefore, the set467
M \ S is assigned to the leaves. We proceed by changing the bids of the leaf-players for the468
tasks in M \ S to 0, i.e., defining a sequence tj for j ∈ M \ S, with tj = (r′, ℓ′j = 0, ℓ
j−1
−j )469
Again, by Lemma 4 and by locality, we get that the allocation of the tasks remains the470
same for the leaf j, and for all the other players as well.471
We end up with an instance t′ where player 1 still takes the first task, while the rest472
of the tasks are assigned to a player with 0 processing time. For t′, the optimal makespan473
is 1/
√
m, while the mechanism achieves makespan equal to 1. We illustrate the case when474
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· · · 1√
m
1 ∞ · · · ∞
∞ 0 · · · ∞
∞ ∞ · · · 0
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In the previous subsection, we showed that the Hybrid Mechanism outperforms all known477
mechanisms and has approximation ratio at most 2. The next theorem shows that this ratio478
is the best possible among all possible mechanisms for stars.479
▶ Theorem 17. There is no deterministic mechanism for stars that can achieve an approx-480
imation ratio better than 2.481
This is a special case of a more general lower bound for the Lp-norm objective (Theorem 30),482
but we give the proof here anyway, since it will be an ingredient of the proof of the following483
theorem (Theorem 18).484
Proof. Let’s assume that the mechanism takes an input where the processing time of the485
root player is rj = aj−1, for each task j, where a > 1 is a parameter, and the processing time486
of the corresponding leaf player for task j is ℓj = aj , as also shown in the following table.487
t =

1 a · · · am−2 am−1
a ∞ · · · ∞ ∞






∞ ∞ · · · am−1 ∞
∞ ∞ · · · ∞ am

If the mechanism assigns all tasks to the root player, then the makespan for this input is488
(am−1)/(a−1), while the optimal makespan is am−1, yielding a ratio of (am−1)/((a−1)am−1).489
Otherwise, let X be the nonempty set of tasks assigned to the leaf players. Let k be the task490
with the maximum index in X. Since it is processed by the leaf player, its processing time is491
ak. Now consider the input in which we change the processing times of the root player to492
r′j =
{
0 j ̸∈ X
rj + ϵ otherwise
for some arbitrarily small ϵ > 0. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the set of tasks assigned493
to the root player remains the same, and as a result the whole allocation stays the same.494
Therefore task k is still assigned to the leaf player k and the makespan of the mechanism is495
at least ak. Notice that the optimum allocation for this input is ak−1 + ϵ which yields an496
approximation ratio of a, as ϵ tends to 0.497
In conclusion, the approximation ratio is min{(am − 1)/((a− 1)am−1), a}, for every a > 1.498
By choosing a = 2, we see that the ratio is 2 − 1/2m−1, which shows that for the class of stars499
no mechanism can have approximation ratio better than 2. For fixed m, the lower bound500
is slightly better than 2 − 1/2m−1, by selecting a to be the positive root of the equation501
(am − 1)/((a− 1)am−1) = a. ◀502
We now show how to extend the previous result to get a lower bound of 1+φ ≈ 2.618 for trees,503
and thus for graphs. This matches the best lower bound for the Nisan-Ronen setting [29]504
that was known until the recent improvements [24, 20, 11], suggesting that studying the505
special case of scheduling in graphs may be useful in attacking the Nisan-Ronen conjecture.506
▶ Theorem 18. No mechanism for trees can achieve approximation ratio 1 + φ ≈ 2.618.507
Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Theorem 17 on the tree shown in Figure 3. The tree508
consists of a star with root 0 and leaves 1, . . . , k in which we add a new node v for each node509
v of the star and connect it to v. These new nodes (players), which we call dummy will not510
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Figure 3 A star with root 0 and leaves 1, . . . , m and its extension to a tree with dummy nodes
be assigned any task by any efficient mechanism since we set their processing times to an511
arbitrarily high value H. The processing times of the edges of the star are exactly the same512
as in the proof of Theorem 17: rj = aj−1 and ℓj = aj , for some a > 1. The processing times513
for all edges are given below:514
rj = aj−1 ℓj = aj j = 1, . . . , k515
r = 0 ℓj = 0516517
where r and ℓj are the processing times of the star vertices of their respective dummy tasks.518
The dummy nodes themselves have a very large processing time H ≫ 1 on these tasks.519
We consider two cases. In the first case, all tasks of the star are assigned to the root520
player 0. We then consider a new instance in which we slightly lower the processing time521
of the root on the tasks of the star (i.e., rj = aj−1 − ϵ for some ϵ > 0) and increase the522
processing time of its dummy task r = ak. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the r-player523
will take this task and all tasks of the star with a total processing time slightly less than524
1 + a+ . . .+ ak = (ak+1 − 1)/(a− 1). It is easy to see that the optimal allocation for this525
instance is ak, and the approximation ratio (ak+1 − 1)/((a− 1)ak).526
In the second case, at least one task of the star is allocated to a leaf. Let p be the star527
task allocated to a leaf with the maximum index (that is, task p of the star is allocated528
to leaf-player p and tasks p+ 1, . . . , k are allocated to the root). We consider the instance529
in which we change the processing times of the root player as follows: all processing times530
of the tasks allocated to the root become 0 and all processing times of the root player for531
the remaining tasks increase slightly. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the r-player will532
still get the same set of tasks. We now create a new instance by increasing the processing533
time of the p-th dummy task: ℓp = ap−1 and slightly decreasing the processing time of534
the leaf p for its task in the star: ℓp = ap − ϵ, for some ϵ > 0. Then again by weak535
monotonicity (Lemma 4), player p will get these two tasks. Although the allocation of the536
other tasks may change, the cost for the mechanism is at least ap + ap−1 − ϵ, while the537
optimal allocation has cost ap−1. Therefore, in this case the mechanism has approximation538
ratio (ap + ap−1)/ap−1 = a+ 1, as ϵ → 0. In any case, the mechanism has approximation539
ratio min{((ak+1 − 1)/((a− 1)ak), a+ 1}. By selecting a = φ, we get a ratio at least 1 + φ540
(as k → ∞). ◀541
Closing the gap between the above lower bound 2.618 of Theorem 18 and the upper bound 4542
(Corollary 15) for mechanisms for trees is a crisp intriguing question.543
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4 Hybrid Mechanisms544
Here we provide the general definitions related to Hybrid Mechanisms, and show necessary545
and sufficient conditions for truthfulness on stars (and hyper-stars3). We emphasize that546
this is a multi-dimensional mechanism design setting. Each leaf j has a single dimensional547
valuation, given by the scalar ℓj but a root has multi-dimensional preferences, given by the548
vector of values. For the sake of convenience, we call non-decreasing real functions increasing,549
and non-increasing functions decreasing. We say strictly increasing/decreasing if we want to550
emphasize strict monotonicity.551
It is known, that an allocation rule can be equipped by a truthful payment scheme iff552
it is weakly monotone [41]. The next two propositions give a characterization of the weak553
monotonicity property in our case, for the leaf-players, and for the root player, respectively:554
▶ Proposition 19. An allocation rule is weakly monotone for a leaf-player i, iff for every r555
and every ℓ−i, whenever leaf-player i gets task i with bid ℓi, then he also gets the task with556
every smaller bid ℓ′i < ℓi.557
▶ Proposition 20. An allocation rule is weakly monotone for the root player if and only558
if for every fixed bid vector ℓ of the other players, and every T ⊆ M a constant gT (ℓ)559
(i.e., independent of r) exists, such that for every r the root player is allocated a set S ∈560
arg minT {r(T ) + gT (ℓ)}.561
The canonical choice for truthful payments to the r-player is then P 0S(ℓ) = g∅(ℓ) − gS(ℓ),562
and all other truthful payments can be obtained by an additive shift by an arbitrary c(ℓ).563
We assume w.l.o.g. that for every fixed ℓ the payments P 0S correspond to an increasing564
set-function of S,4 because a set of tasks with higher cost and less payments can not be565
allocated to player 0 by a truthful mechanism.5 Motivated by Proposition 20 we restrict our566
search for truthful mechanisms on star graphs as follows:567
▶ Definition 21. [Hybrid Mechanism] Assume that an m-variate function gT : Rm → R is568
given for every T ⊆ M, so that for every fixed vector ℓ ≥ 0 the values {gT (ℓ)}T ⊆M correspond569
to a decreasing setfunction of T. For any input (r, ℓ), a Hybrid Mechanism (for the functions570
{gT }T ⊆M ) allocates a set S to the root player such that571
S ∈ arg min
T
{r(T ) + gT (ℓ)};
if there are more than one such sets S, the mechanism breaks ties according to the lexicographic572
order over all subsets of M. The items in M \ S are assigned to the leaves.573
Now for any i ∈ M fix all bids in the input except for ri, i.e., fix the vectors r−i and ℓ. The574
following function ψi[r−i, ℓ] defines the so called critical value for the bid ri. We omit the575
argument r−i, ℓ whenever they are obvious from the context.576
▶ Definition 22.
ψi = ψi[r−i, ℓ] = min
T :i/∈T
{r(T ) + gT (ℓ)} − min
T :i∈T
{r(T \ {i}) + gT (ℓ)}
3 For simplicity of presentation we give here all definitions and lemmata for the case of stars, and discuss
the necessary changes for hyper-stars in the full version.
4 We call a setfunction P increasing, if P (S′) ≤ P (S) whenever S′ ⊂ S; we call it strictly increasing if
the inequality is strict.
5 See also the virtual payments in [12].
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The next lemma states that ψi is nonnegative, and is, indeed, a critical value function. The577
proofs are straightforward, and due to space limitations are deferred to the full version.578
▶ Lemma 23. Let i ∈ M, and arbitrary nonnegative bid vectors r−i and ℓ be fixed. Then579
ψi[r−i, ℓ] ≥ 0, furthermore for every ri < ψi the root player receives task i, and for every580
ri > ψi the leaf player with bid ℓi receives task i.581
The following lemma provides various necessary or sufficient conditions for the truthfulness582
of Hybrid Mechanisms in terms of monotonicity of the critical value function ψi as a function583
of ℓi. For the proof of the lemma see the full version. There we also present an example584
mechanism showing that conditions (b) and (c) are both not necessary for the Hybrid585
Mechanism to be truthful.586
▶ Lemma 24. For the truthfulness of the Hybrid Mechanism with given {gT }T ⊆M functions587
(i.e., for a truthful payment scheme to exist),588
(a) it is necessary that for every i ∈ M and every fixed (r−i, ℓ−i) the function ψi(ℓi) =589
ψi[r−i, ℓ−i](ℓi) is an increasing function of ℓi;590
(b) it is sufficient that for every i ∈ M and every fixed (r−i, ℓ−i) the function ψi(ℓi) =591
ψi[r−i, ℓ−i](ℓi) is a strictly increasing function of ℓi;592
(c) it is sufficient that for every i and ℓ−i the gT (ℓi, ℓ−i) is an increasing function of ℓi593
whenever i /∈ T, and decreasing function of ℓi whenever i ∈ T.594
▶ Corollary 25. The Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing and the Hybrid Lp Mechanism595
on stars are truthful.596
Proof. The first statement follows from the fact that the Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Bal-597
ancing fulfils (c). Clearly, gT (ℓ) = maxi/∈T {ℓi} = maxi∈M\T {ℓi} is an increasing setfunction598
of the sets M \ T, and therefore a decreasing setfunction of the sets T, for fixed ℓ. For fixed599
T, maxi/∈T {ℓi} is an increasing function of ℓi for every i /∈ T, and it is independent of ℓi600
(constant function) if i ∈ T. Finally, it is easy to see that the Hybrid Lp Mechanism (see601
Section 5) fulfils (b) as well as (c). ◀602
5 Mechanisms for Lp-norm optimization603
In this section we generalize some of the results of Section 3 to the objective of minimizing604






The makespan scheduling problem is the special case of p = ∞. We consider all positive608
values of p, but we deal separately with the case p ≥ 1, in which Lp is a proper norm, and609
the case p ∈ (0, 1), where the Lp function is not subadditive (i.e., the triangle inequality does610
not hold). Due to space limitations we postpone most of the results and their proofs to the611
full version of the paper. There we also consider the maximization case, which for p = 1612
corresponds to auctions.613
Consider an instance of the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and614
set of tasks M . Notice that for stars the objective of minimizing the Lp-norm corresponds to615






p over all task sets T ⊆ M given to the r-player.616
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▶ Definition 26 (Hybrid Lp Mechanism for stars). For a given 0 < p ≤ ∞, and an instance617
of the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and set M of tasks, let618










The mechanism assigns S to the root and the remaining tasks to leaves. Ties are broken in a621
deterministic way (e.g., lexicographically).622
The argmin expression that defines the Hybrid Lp Mechanism coincides with the VCG623
mechanism for p = 1 and with the Hybrid Mechanism of Section 3 for p → ∞. As it is624
shown in Corollary 25, the Hybrid Lp mechanism is truthful. It is a happy coincidence that625
replacing the operator sum with this more complicated expression preserves the truthfulness626
of the mechanism, a fact that rarely holds.627
Next we show two upper bound results for the approximation ratio (for the Lp-norm628
objective) separately in case p ≥ 1, and in case 0 < p ≤ 1, respectively. We summarize here629
the inequalities that we will use:630






























▶ Theorem 28. For the problem of minimizing the Lp-norm, the Hybrid Lp Mechanism for637
stars has approximation ratio of at most 2(p−1)/p, when p ≥ 1, and 2(1−p)/p, when 0 < p < 1.638






p be the subset assigned to the root in the639
optimal allocation, S be the subset assigned to the root by the Lp Mechanism, OPT be the640
optimal Lp-norm, and ALG be the Lp-norm achieved by the Hybrid Lp Mechanism.641





























where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality,6 the second from the definition647
of the Hybrid Lp Mechanism, while the last one from Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 27,648





6 ∥x + y∥p ≤ ∥x∥p + ∥y∥p for x = (r(S), 0, 0, ..., 0) and y = (0, ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓ|M|)
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the second from the definition of the Lp Mechanism, while the last one from the fact that656
(α+ β)p ≤ αp + βp, when 0 < p ≤ 1. ◀657
As in the case of makespan, we can use the mechanism to other domains by decomposing658
them. We can apply the Star-Cover mechanism (Definition 10) to get good approximation659
ratios for general domains:660
▶ Theorem 29. For p ≥ 1, the Star-Cover mechanism for a given multigraph G that uses the661
Hybrid Lp Mechanism on every star of a fixed star decomposition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} is truthful662
and has an approximation ratio at most (2c(T ))(p−1)/p of the Lp-norm of the machines’ costs,663
where c(T ) is the star contention number of the decomposition.664
We also provide corresponding negative results for mechanisms. For the case, of p ≥ 1,665
the next theorem shows that the Hybrid Lp Mechanism has optimal approximation ratio.666
▶ Theorem 30. For any p ≥ 1, there is no deterministic mechanism for stars that can667
achieve an approximation ratio better than 21−1/p for the Lp-objective.668
We point out that all known (local) mechanisms perform much worse that the Hybrid669
Mechanism. Observe that for p = 1, the VCG is optimal, but for large p the inefficiency of670
all local mechanisms grows and tends to
√
m :671
▶ Theorem 31. For minimizing the Lp-norm on stars, all local mechanisms, including672
affine minimizers and task-independent mechanisms, have approximation ratio of at least673
m
1
2 (1−1/p) = (n− 1) 12 (1−1/p), when p ≥ 1.674
The lower bound that we give for the case of p < 1 does not match exactly the upper bound,675
which leaves open the possibility that there exists a mechanism with better approximation676
ratio than the Hybrid Lp Mechanism. Notice that the following approximation ratio tends677
to infinity as p tends to 0.678
▶ Theorem 32. For any 0 < p ≤ 1 and every a > 1, there is no deterministic mechanism679









By selecting an appropriate a, this is Ω(p−1/ ln(p−1)).683
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